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AD868942 

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Distribution  authorized  to  U.S.  Gov't,  agencies 
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Administrative/Operational  Use;  27  MAR  1970. 
Other  requests  shall  be  referred  to  Army 
Concept  Team  in  Vietnam,  APO  San  Francisco,  CA. 


_ AUTHORITY 

OACSFOR  ltr,  13  Sep  1973 


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AD  868942 


STATE.’"  NT  V  2  UNCIA-'  5TFI3D 

*  *  ,  v  - ■  >.  rols  and  each 

This  document  i.  sue  -  be 

■  :  - 

-.:ade  only  with  j  ■ 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ARMY 
ARMY  CONCEPT  TEAM  IN  VIETNAM 
APO  San  Francisco  9638U 

27  March  1970 

Interim  Letter  Report  -  XM191  Multishot  Portable  Flame 
Weapon  -  ENSURE  263  (ACG-2U/69I ) 


AVIE-GCD 

SUBJECT: 


Commanding  General 
United  States  Army,  Vietnam 
ATTN :  AVHGC-DST 
APO  96375 


1.  REFERENCES 


D  DO 

:nn  njEJnl 


a.  Letter,  AVDE-GT-T,  HQ  9th  Inf  Div,  28  August  1968,  subject:  Re¬ 
quest  for  Flame  Weapon  to  Neutralize  Bunker  Positions  (U),  Confidential. 

b.  Message,  AVHGC-DST,  HQ  USARV  71*375,  1*»  October  1968,  subject: 

Tong  Range  Flame  Weapon  (ENSURE  (U),  Confidential. 

c.  Message,  DA  887885,  20  November  1968,  subject:  Long  Range  Flame 
Weapon  (ENSURE  263). 

d.  DF ,  AVHGC-DST,  HQ  USARV,  16  May  1969,  subject:  Evaluation  of  the 
XM191  Multishot  Portable  Flame  Weapon  (MPFW)  System  (U),  Confidential. 

e.  Message,  AVHGC-DST,  HQ  USARV,  63293,  23  May  1969,  subject:  XM191 
Multishot  Portable  Flame  Weapon  (MPFW)  (U),  Confidential. 

f.  Message,  AVHGC-DST,  HQ  USARV,  831U8,  21  September  1969,  subject: 
XM191  Multishot  Portable  Flame  Weapon  (ENSURE  263)  (U),  Confidential. 


2.  PURPOSE 


r 


1 


f'*l<  « 


?iu«iT 


to  determine  the  effectiveness  and  suitability  of  the  XM191  Multishot 
Portable  Flame  Weapon  (MPFW)  in  the  combat  environment  of  the  Republic  of 
Vietnam  (RVK). 

3.  OBJECTIVES 


MPFW. 


a.  Objective  1.  To  evaluate  the  operational  performance  of  the  XM191 


ll 


I 


b.  Objective  2.  To  document  tactical  employment  doctrine  developed 
from  field  use  of  the  XM191  MPFW. 

c.  Objective  3.  To  determine  the  user  acceptability  and  suitability 
of  the  XIII 91  MPFW. 

d.  Objective  k.  To  determine  the  adequacy  of  technical  documentation 
and  truining  guidance  for  the  operation  of  the  XM191  MPFW. 

1* .  BACKGROUND 


The  general  requirement  for  a  weapon  capable  of  firing  an  encapsulated 
flame  round  at  targets  to  ranges  of  100  meters  or  greater  was  stated  by 
the  UC  Marine  Corps  in  October  1966-  A  specific  requirement  for  a  flame 
weapon  to  neutralize  bunker  positions  when  fired  from  standoff  ranges  of 
200  meters  or  more  was  stated  by  the  9th  Infantry  Division  in  August  1968, 
resulting  in  approval  of  ENSURE  263.  The  weapon  developed  combines  a 
warhead  containing  a  pyrophoric  (spontaneously  igniting)  compound  with  the 
rocket  motor  and  other  components  of  the  M72  Light  Antitank  Weapon  (LAW) 
system.  This  item  has  been  designated  the  XM191  Multishot  Portable  Flame 
Weapon  (MPFW).  A  Joint  Army/Mar ine  team  demonstrated  the  weapon  in  RVN 
during  February  -  March  1969.  All  organizations  attending  the  demonstra¬ 
tions  indicated  a  high  level  of  interest. 

5.  DESCRIPTION 

The  XM191  MPFW  system  consists  of  the  lightweight,  shoulder-fired, 
four-tube,  semi-automatic,  66mm,  XM202  rocket  launcher  (Figures  la  A  b) 
and-  the  factory-loaded,  four-round  XM71*  rocket  clip  (Figure  2).  The 
system,  as  it  appears  when  it  is  assembled  and  ready  to  fire,  is  shown 
in  Figure  3.  The  rocket,  which  is  propelled  by  the  M51*  LAW  motor,  has 
a  warhead  containing  1.3  pounds  of  thickened  triethylaluminum  (TPA). 

A  complete  description,  including  tabulated  data,  is  contained  in  an 
annex  to  this  report. 

6.  METHOD  OF  EVALUATION 


a.  Approach 

The  evaluation  of  the  XM3  91  MPFW  system  was  conducted  in  two 
phases.  The  first  phase,  completed  in  January  1970,  consisted  of  famil¬ 
iarization  and  training  for  US  Army  divisions  and  separate  brigade-size 
units.  Concurrently,  four  units — the  kth,  23rd  (Americal),  and  25th 
Infantry  Divisions  and  the  1st  Cavalry  Division  (AM) — ,  upon  completion 
of  training,  participated  in  an  interim  90-day  evaluation.  A  second, 
or  full-scale,  evaluation  was  conducted  by  the  above  units  and  the 
following  additional  organizations:  1st  Infantry  Division;  101st  Air¬ 
borne  Division  (AM);  173d  Airborne  Brigade;  11th  Armored  Cavalry  Regi¬ 
ment;  199th  Light  Infantry  Brigade;  1st  Brigade,  5th  Infantry  Division 
('lech);  and  3d  Brigade,  9th  Infantry  Division.  A  staggered  schedule, 
dictated  by  the  times  that  launchers  and  ammunition  were  received 


2 


LAUNCHER,  ROCKET:  TPA,  lj-TTJB5 


5 


L 


ROCKET,  INCENDIARY:  66mm,  TPA,  4-ROUND  CLIP,  XM?4 


XM191  SYSTEM 


in— country  and  the  ability  of  the  UE  Army  Edgewood  Arsenal  Hew  Equipment 
Training  Team  (NETT)  to  provide  the  required  support,  was  followed. 

b.  Data  Collection 


The  principal  data  collection  agencies  within  the  participating 
organizations  were  the  divisional  or  brigade  chemical  sections  augmented 
by  a  noncommissioned  officer  evaluator.  Normally,  the  chemical  sections 
became  the  unit  action  offices,  and  directed  the  activities  of  the  evalua¬ 
tor.  As  soon  as  possible  following  a  reported  employment  of  the  weapon, 
the  evaluator  interviewed  the  firer  and,  if  possible,  the  firer's  imme¬ 
diate  superior.  A  questionnaire  was  employed  to  record  the  details  of 
the  action,  performance  of  the  weapon  and  ammunition,  and  associated 
human  factors.  As  weapons  utilization  warranted,  small  unit  leaders 
and  commanders  up  to  battalion  level  were  interviewed  periodically  by 
chemical  officers  and  the  ACTIV  project  officer.  These  planned  inter¬ 
views  were  designed  to  determine  the  views  of  responsible  officers  and 
NCOs  at  these  echelons  regarding  acceptability  and  adequacy  of  the  XM191 
system,  and  to  assist  in  the  development  of  employment  doctrine. 

c.  Environment 


The  evaluation  was  conducted  in  all  the  major  geomorphic  regions 
of  RVN,  including  the  Northern  and  Central  Coastlands,  the  Northern  High¬ 
lands,  the  Western  Plateau,  and  the  Mekong  Terrace.  The  last  named  region 
has  many  of  the  characteristics  of  the  Mekong  Delta.  All  types  of  terrain, 
from  rice  fields  through  elephant  grass  savannas  to  dense  triple  canopy 
rain  forest,  were  encountered  in  the  evaluation,  as  well  as  areas  where 
the  rocky  and  broken  nature  of  the  topography  provided  severe  tests  of 
durability  and  portability.  The  northeast  monsoon  predominated  during 
most  of  the  evaluation,  causing  heavy  rainfall  and  difficult  traf f icability 
on  the  Northern  and  Central  Coastlands  and  Northern  Highlands .  The  Western 
Plateau  and  Mekong  Terrace  were  generally  dry,  and  provided  some  opportuni¬ 
ties  for  secondary  fires. 

T.  OBJECTIVE  1.  TO  EVALUATE  THE  OPERATIONAL  PERFORMANCE  OF  THE  XM191  MPFW 
a.  Range  and  Accuracy 

The  preponderance  of  targets  engaged  were  classified  as  area  targets 
from  which  enemy  fire  was  received  or  which  were  suspected  to  conceal  enemy 
troops.  These  targets  were  engaged  at  ranges  varying  from  75  meters  to 
approximately  700  meters,  with  the  average  being  about  260  meters.  With 
respect  to  accuracy  of  fire  against  area  targets,  gunners  claimed  22  first- 
round  hits  (a  round  impacting  within  5  meters  of  the  target  was  defined  as 
a  hit)  out  of  fired,  for  a  percentage  of  65  percent.  Few  valid  conclu¬ 
sions  can  be  drawn,  however,  as  one-fifth  of  these  targets  were  engaged  at 
night;  also,  the  target  center  of  an  area  target,  such  as  a  hedgerow,  was 
largely  a  matter  of  the  firer's  opinion.  While  the  number  of  engagements 


7 


of  legitl-atc  roint  targets ,  i.e.  wear  or. 3  z  ositi  'rn  ,  raves,  and  bunkers , 
war  1  i~.: ,  t,v ■"  nr;,^r  vr.’-j  e-i  fr-'m  ion  nr^cr"  to  I  cr>  r«“trra,  +  :  <- 

nvoi-tM  re*rg  o^o  tfor**  t’-ar.  7°  p'-rc^-t  of  thr  rourds  fi^ed 

amsirct  pcirt  targets  vcre  at  r»n*»s  of  100  to  POO  neters .  Hsl  ng  t^e 
criteri”  defined  above,  7^  percent  of  the  gunners  achieved  first-round 
h'hr  on  e^irt.  targets. 

V  ,  mav-;Tot,  Of  feet. 

( 1  )  "’ho  burst  radius  was  approximately  20  meters,  except  when 
confined  by  vegetation  or  terrain,  ’’ounds  observed  to  impact  in  soft, 
or  marshy  terrain  had  reduced  effectiveness  in  this  respect. 

(2)  "Vo  confirmed  fatal iti-s  ear.  he  directly  attributed  to  the 
efforts  o'  fie  weapon  at  the  tir.e  ttir  rer  nrt  was  prepared.  Additionally , 
on  rev"rml  occasions,  enemy  soldi  ors  were  observed  fleeing  from  their 
rcsitions  with  their  clothing  fcurninr,  and  pieces  of  individual  equipment 
were  found  turnin'-  at  the  scene  o'*  the  action.  In  several  engagement  s , 
enemy  troops  were  killed  or  wounded  by  other  weapons  after  they  were 
forced  from  corcealment  or  cover  by  the  flame  rounds.  "Tie  psychological 
impact  of  the  weapon  appeared  to  be  considerable,  as  enemy  activity 
invariably  ceased  after  employment  of  the  flame  rounds.  After  a  multiple 
round  firing,  users  made  statements  such  as  "The  entire  interior  of  the 
cave  war  one  vail  of  flames"  and  "The  entire  hedgerow  was  set  afire  and 
the  TfM  cane  out  and  we  engaged  then  with  other  weapons."  Tn  general, 
during  the  dry  season  in  the  Mekong  ’"’errace  region,  secondary  fires  were 
easily  started,  which  materially  enhanced  the  effectiveness  of  the  weapon 
ir.  the  reconnaissance-by-fire  role.  The  same  applied  to  bamboo  and  grass 
structures  when  they  were  attacked. 

c  .  del i ability 

In  the  course  of  the  interim  evaluation,  there  were  no  incidents 
of  launcher  malfunction  during  combat  firing  or  during  the  training 
provided  by  the  Edgewood  Arsenal.  f.'ET  team.  Out  of  a  total  of  25**  fielded 
to  date,  3  launchers  have  been  evacuated  to  CONUS  for  repair  and  return 
for  defects  discovered  during  initial  inspection  upon  receipt.  All  three 
launchers  had  defective  trigger  mechanisms.  The  trigger  either  failed  to 
return  properly,  or  required  excessive  pressure  to  function.  Tn  addition, 
during  unit  training  conducted  in  the  1st  Cavalry  Division  (AM),  the  detent 
pin  on  the  clip  lock  assembly  of  one  launcher  failed,  rendering  the  launcher 
unserviceable .  "Tiis  was  the  only  field  failure  since  the  weapon  system 
was  deployed  in  late  October  19*’“.  Experience  with  the  XM7**  rocket  clips 
and  rounds  was  better  than  that  realized  with  the  launcher.  No  duds  were 
reported  in  238  rounds  fired  in  combat,  and  only  7  duds  were  recorded 
among  6U0  rounds  fired  in  the  training  activities  of  the  NETT.  The  over¬ 
all  dud  rate  based  on  documented  firings  is  0.8  percent.  Tn  addition 
three  misfires,  in  which  the  rocket  motor  failed,  have  been  reported. 


8 


OP..TFCTIVK  ...  ^0  D^CTMKNT  TACTIC  A!,  F’^PI.OYMnKT  DOCTRI.TE  DEVKT.nPKD 

from  ^ield  urr  of  up  xrioi  mpfvT 


a.  Tyres  of  Units 

Organizations  part i ci j  ati r.g  in  the  interim  evaluation  distributed 
the  available  weapons  (?U  to  30  within  each  division)  among  a  variety  of 
subordinate  units,  including: 

(1)  Infantry  and  mechanized  infantry  companies. 

(2)  Divisional  cavalry  troops. 

(3)  Aero-rifle  platoons  of  air  cavalry. 

( h )  Miscellaneous  headquarters-controlled  elements,  i.e.,  anti¬ 
tank  platoons,  U.2  inch  mortar  sections,  chemical  sections, 
etc. 

b.  Types  of  Operations 

The  operations  of  smaller  units  were  primarily  tactical  sweeps 
or  interdiction  and  ambush  missions.  Although  bunker  complexes  and 
similar  positions  were  encountered  with  some  frequency,  the  standoff 
tactics  used  during  the  evaluation  emphasized  the  employment  of  heavy 
support  weapons  to  accomplish  the  neutralization  mission.  Consequently, 
the  number  of  conventional  assault-type  operations,  in  which  MPFW  would 
be  most  useful,  was  drastically  reduced.  Furthermore,  the  nature  of 
normal  operations  of  dismounted  infantry  units  in  the  Vietnam  combat 
environment  was  not  conducive  to  carrying  the  weapons  in  the  manner  of  an 
organic,  crew-served  weapon  [see  Paragraphs  8e  and  9b(l)].  However,  on 
a  trial  basis,  some  units  carried  the  MPFW  on  short-range  patrols. 

Mounted  units,  i.e.  mechanized  infantry  or  cavalry  units,  carried  the 
weapon  as  a  part  of  the  normal  combat  load  and  employed  it  frequently; 
most  MPFW  usage  was  by  these  units  . 

c .  Command  and  Control 


As  a  result  of  the  low  density  and  novelty  of  the  weapon,  tactical 
control  was  frequently  exercised  at  a  higher  echelon  than  normal.  Company 
commanders,  rather  than  platoon  or  squad  leaders,  often  selected  targets 
or  positioned  the  weapon.  As  additional  numbers  of  weapons  are  fielded, 
it  is  likely  that  employment  will  be  decentralized  to  platoon  or  squad 
level. 

d.  Tactics  and  Techniques 
( 1 )  General 

Although  combat  employment  of  the  XM191  MPFW  system  during 
the  interim  evaluation  period  was  limited,  it  provided  some  indication 


9 


of  the  ultimate  missions  and  employment  techniques  for  the  weapon.  The 
primary  role  of  the  weapon,  and  the  one  for  which  it  was  designed,  is 
the  neutralization  and/or  destruction  of  hunkers  and  other  manned  fighting 
positions.  However,  the  current  nature  and  level  of  combat  operations  in 
RVh!  modified  the  expected  patterns  of  usage  and  tactics.  Missions  to  date 
have  included: 

(a)  Attack  of  bunkers,  caves,  and  weapons  positions,  i.e. 
point  targets. 

(b)  Attack  of  covered  and/or  concealed  area  targets. 

(c)  Reconnaissance  by  fire. 

(d)  Fire  base  defense. 

(e)  Other  operations. 

(2)  Point  Targets 

Although  infrequently  engaged,  compared  to  other  targets, 
roint  targets  ,  such  as  caves  on  the  mountain  Nui  Ba  Den  in  Tay  Ninh 
Province  and  in  the  rocky  hills  surrounding  the  Bong  Son  Plain  in  Binh 
Dinh  Province,  were  attacked  using  the  MPFW  system.  In  these  instances, 
the  weapon  was  conventionally  employed  in  support  of  rifle  squads  search¬ 
ing  for  enemy  hiding  places  or  to  suppress  sniper  fire  from  enemy  posi¬ 
tions.  On  one  occasion  enemy  supporting  weapons,  including  a  light  mortar 
and  a  recoilless  rifle,  were  engaged  and  silenced. 

( 3 )  Area  Targets 

Wooded  areas,  hedgerows,  and  areas  of  high  grass  concealing 
enemy  troops  were  effectively  attacked  several  times.  The  tactic  used  in 
these  instances  was  to  place  flame  over  a  wide  area  and  force  the  enemy 
to  abandon  his  position,  thereby  subjecting  himself  to  fire  from  other 
weapons . 


(U  )  Reconnaig sane e-by-f ire 


Reconnai ssance-hy-f ire  of  possible  enemy  hiding  places  by 
means  of  the  flame  round  was  the  most  frequent  node  of  employment.  On 
ore  o-casior. ,  troops  were  reluctant  to  enter  a  dense  bamboo  and  brush, 
hedgerow,  ever  after  it  had  beer  swept  with  snail  arms  and  automatic 
weapons  fire;  however,  after  eight  flame  rnurds  had  beer:  fired  along 
the  lenrth  of  the  hedgerow,  troops  entered  the  position  with  corfiier.cc. 
Tn  the  cited  instance,  an  enemy  weapons  and  supply  cache  was  located. 

(.5 )  Pise  Defense 

Commanders  visualized  usinr  the  XT'l^l  ,rPFW  i r.  this  role 
r  its  rsychological  effect,  as  well  as  capitalizing  on  the  fact  that 


the  low  explosive  power  of  the  rocket  warhead  would  minimize  the  damage 
to  wire  entanglements  while  disabling  and/or  repelling  infiltrators. 
Employment  in  this  manner  was  not  reported;  however,  enemy  attacks  by 
fire  from  ranges  out  to  700  meters  were  effectively  countered. 

(6)  Q*her  Operations 

One  instance  was  reported  in  which  the  XM191  MPFW  was  used 
on  a  night  ambush  position.  The  weapon  was  fired  at  suspected  enemy  move¬ 
ment,  but  no  results  were  determined.  Several  firings  were  made  at  night 
based  on  radar  fightings  from  night  defensive  positions.  In  all  cases 
movement  ceased  after  employment  of  the  weapon.  Commanders  also  attempted 
to  capitalize  on  the  added  psychological  effect  of  the  flame  rocket  at  night 
by  firing  on  likely  approach  routes  of  enemy  reconnaissance  elements. 

e.  Effects  of  Environment 


The  physical  environment  of  RVN  had  a  significant  effect  on  tactical 
employment  of  the  XM191  MPFW.  The  conspicuous  lack  of  firing  data  on  re¬ 
duction  of  bunkers  was  a  partial  result  of  the  frequent  enemy  practice  of 
selecting  the  most  densely  forested  areas  in  which  to  construct  his  permanent 
fighting  positions.  Frequently,  bunker  complexes  were  not  located  until  friend 
ly  troops  were  virtually  on  top  of  or  among  the  bunkers.  In  close  terrain  of 
this  nature,  the  minimum  range  restriction,  intervening  vegetation,  and  back 
blast  clearance  requirements  drastically  reduced  the  utility  of  the  weapon. 

At  the  interim  stage  of  the  evaluation  no  pattern  of  deleterious  effects  on 
components  of  the  launcher  attributable  to  the  effects  of  the  environment  were 
discerned. 

f .  Basis  of  Issue 


Although  the  current  evaluation  basis  of  issue  is  one  per  company-size 
unit,  nearly  all  commanders  recommended  a  basis  of  issue  of  one  per  platoon. 

Wo  direct  field  comparisons  were  made  with  the  standard  portable  flame  throw¬ 
ers,  but,  at  this  point  in  the  evaluation,  two  divisions  recommend  replace¬ 
ment  of  these  items  with  the  XM202  rocket  launcher  on  at  least  a  one-for-one 
basis.  A  basis  of  issue  will  be  recommended  upon  completion  of  the  full 
evaluation. 

9.  OBJECTIVE  3.  TO  DETERMINE  THE  USER  ACCEPTABILITY  AMD  SUITABILITY 
OF  THE  XM191  MPFW 

a.  Requirement 

( 1)  Utilization 


The  number  of  combat  employments  of  the  MPFW  during  the  interim 
evaluation  period  was  low,  consistent  with  the  general  level  of  combat  activity- 
in  recent  months.  Four  divisions  have  participated  during  at  least  a  portion 
of  the  interim  evaluation  period.  These  organizations,  with  an  intial 
aggregate  of  ll*5  weapons ,  reported  a  total 


11 


of  38  engagements  of  known  or  suspected  enemy  targets.  The  combat  expen¬ 
diture  rate  per  division  averaged  10.7  rounds  or  It. 7  clips  per  month  (0.017 
rounds /launcher /day  ) .  Ammunition  expended  in  training  or  demonstrations 
was  not  included  in  the  above  figures.  Only  26  percent  of  the  targets  en¬ 
gaged  could  be  considered  as  point  targets,  the  majority  of  firings  were, 
against  area  targets  such  as  hedgerows,  wood-lines,  and  similar  known  or 
likely  hiding  places  of  the  enemy.  The  predominant  utilization  during  the 
interim  period  was  reconnaissance  by  fire  on  suspected  enemy  locations; 
generally  these  were  later  found  to  be  unoccupied.  Point  targets  engaged 
wore,  for  the  greater  part,  caves  or  positions  located  in  rocky  crevices 
in  hilly  terrain  from  which  fire  was  received  or  where  enemy  activity  was 
reported.  Approximately  20  percent  of  the  combat  usage  occurred  at  night. 
Those  fircr  were  largely  defensive  in  nature  and  were  based  on  visual  or 
ground  radar  sightings. 

( 2 )  User  Opinion 

From  the  incejtion  of  the  evaluation,  commanders  were  generally 
enthusiastic  about  the  possibilities  for  combat  employment  of  the  XM191 
' lPFV .  Interviews  and  unit  reports  indicated  that  all  organizations  currently 
employing  the  weapon,  and  those  in  the  process  of  receiving  it,  recognized 
a  definite  need  for  a  flame  capability  in  a  weapon  of  long  range  and  which 
was  simple  to  support  logistically . 

b.  Design  Features 

( 1 )  Weight  and  Configuration 

The  weight  and  configuration  of  the  predominantly  fiberglass 
and  aluminum  XM191  'iPFW  provided  improved  portability  over  most  crew— served 
or  support  type  weapons.  However,  in  the  physical  environment  of  Vietnam 
most  dismounted  infantry  soldiers  thought  the  weapon  was  too  heavy  and 
bulky  to  carry  as  an  integral  squad  or  platoon  weapon.  Foot  soldiers, 
already  burdened  with  1*0  to  60  pounds  of  equipment,  were  understandably 
reluctant  to  carry  an  additional  26-pound  load;  most  commanders  concurred 
in  this  view. 

(2)  Ease  of  Operation 

Initial  impressions  gained  during  training  were  that  the 
operating  sequences  of  preparing  the  weapon  to  fire,  reloading,  and  re¬ 
turning  it  to  carrying  configuration  were  awkward  to  perform.  Repetitive 
performance  of  these  steps  in  training  by  soldiers  resulted  in  greatly 
improved  speed.  The  first  and  second  times  through,  the  prepare-to-fire 
sequence  usually  took  about  one  minute.  With  five  or  six  repetitions, 
times  dropped  to  20  or  30  seconds  for  the  average  gunner.  As  expected, 
opening  the  front  cover,  rotating  the  handle,  and  engaging  the  latch  that 
releases  the  trigger  handle  assembly,  was  the  most  awkward  and  time-consum¬ 
ing  step  in  the  sequence,  particularly  for  men  with  short  arms. 


12 


The  single  design  feature  most  commented  upon  was  the  reflect¬ 
ing  sight,  originally  designed  for  the  3.5-inch  rocket  launcher.  If  the 
available  light  was  poor,  it  was  extremely  difficult  for  the  firer  to  dis¬ 
tinguish  the  sight  reticle.  The  sight  developed  for  future  production 
models  should  not  have  this  drawback.  Night  firings  served  to  emphasize 
the  fact  that  the  existing  sight  was  virtually  useless  after  dark;  conse¬ 
quently,  night  firings  were  conducted  by  estimation.  If  this  usage  pattern 
continues,  development  of  a  reticle  illumination  system  will  be  indicated. 

( *»)  Durability 

Damage  to  the  launcher  and  ammunition  resulting  from  field 
activities  was  minimal  during  the  interim  evaluation.  Two  launchers  were 
rendered  unserviceable  during  an  operation  because  they  were  dropped  approx¬ 
imately  5  meters  from  a  helicopter  onto  rocky  terrain.  The  damage  in  both 
instances  consisted  of  cracks  in  the  fiberglass  tubes. 

( 5)  Trigger  Mechanism 

Although  no  reports  of  malfunction  have  been  received  from 
the  field,  three  launchers  were  found  to  have  faulty  trigger  mechanisms 
upon  initial  inspection  by  the  NETT.  The  trigger  and  trigger  linkage 
proved  to  be  components  of  the  system  readily  subject  to  malfunction, 
e.g. ,  sticking,  excess  play,  or  failure  to  return  properly.  This  is  ar 
area  that  should  be  considered  in  product  improvement  efforts. 

c.  Safety 

( 1 )  Desirable  Features 


The  triply  redundant  features  of  the  safety  button,  front 
cover  interlock  system,  and  safety  guide  tube  provided  adequate  protection 
against  inadvertent  firing  of  the  launcher  prior  to  the  completion  of  the 
prepare-to-fire  sequence.  The  simple  clip  latch  and  spring-actuated  re¬ 
traction  of  the  firing  pin  mechanism  provided  a  simple  and  positive  means 
of  rendering  the  launcher  safe  for  extraction  of  the  ammunition  clip  in 
the  event  of  malfunction.  The  location  of  the  rocket  primers,  recessed 
within  the  clip  manifold,  provided  a  high  assurance  against  accidental 
ignition  of  a  rocket  motor  by  means  other  than  the  firing  pin. 

( 2 )  Undesirable  Features 


Two  aspects  of  the  trigger  safety  button  were  commented 
upon  by  users.  It  was  noted  that  the  direction  of  movement  between  the 
"Safe"  and  "Fire"  positions  was  opposite  to  that  of  most  weapons,  with 
forward  being  "Safe"  and  rearward  "Fire."  This  could  result  in  a  failure 
to  safe  the  weapon  after  firing,  and  thus  produce  a  hazardous  condition 


13 


on  a  subsequent  preparat ion-for-firing  sequence.  The  second  problem  area 
involved  two  reported  incidents  of  the  safety  button  vibrating  off  the 
"Safe"  position  after  the  veapons  were  transported  for  a  period  of  time 
in  tracked  vehicles.  The  frequency  with  which  the  weapon  is  likely  to  be 
transported  in  this  manner  warrants  correction  of  this  potential  safety 
hazard . 


(3)  Accidents 


During  the  evaluation  one  serious  accident  was  investigated. 

A  launcher  fired  while  attempts  were  being  made  to  retract  the  clip  into 
the  launcher.  The  launcher  was  destroyed  due  to  the  tactical  situation, 
so  the  exact  mechanical  cause  of  the  accident,  if  any,  could  not  be  deter¬ 
mined.  Two  operating  personnel  were  injured  because,  contrary  to  safety 
instructions,  portions  of  their  bodies  were  in  the  rocket  motor  back- 
blast  area  of  the  weapon.  Increased  safety  consciousness  was  stressed 
during  the  remainder  of  the  training  program. 

d.  Logistics 

A  major  factor  contributing  to  the  acceptability  of  the  XM191 
MPFW  was  the  simplification  of  the  logistics  that  were  associated  with 
flame  operations  in  the  past.  Freedom  from  fuel  mixing  and  pressuriza¬ 
tion  requirements  was  a  clear  advantage  from  the  inception  of  the  evalua¬ 
tion.  Transportation  and  storage  of  the  XM71*  incendiary  rocket  clips 
through  normal  in-eountry  ammunition  channels  proved  to  be  trouble-free. 
Care  and  cleaning  requirements  proved  simple  and  considerably  less  demand¬ 
ing  than  with  other  weapons  systems . 

10.  OBJECTIVE  U.  TO  DETERMINE  THE  ADEQUACY  OF  TRAINING  GUIDANCE  AMD 
TECHNICAL  DOCUMENTATION  FOR  THE  OPERATION  OF  THE  XM191  MPFW 


a.  Training 

(l)  Formal  Program 

Initial  instruction  on  the  XM191  MPFW  was  presented  to  the 
divisions  participating  in  the  evaluation  by  the  Edgewood  Arsenal  NETT. 
Instruction  was  based  upon  the  Program  of  Instruction  (POI)  published  by 
the  New  Equipment  Training  Section  of  the  Weapons  Development  and  Engineer¬ 
ing  Laboratories  of  Edgewood  Arsenal.  This  program  consisted  of  12  hours 
of  instruction,  broken  into  5  hours  of  lecture  and  demonstration  and  7 
hours  of  practical  exercises,  including  dry  and  live  firing  of  the  system. 
This  POI  was  tailored  for  a  class  of  about  12  students,  and  employed  two 
instructors/demonstrators .  Two  launchers  and  inert  XM7h  rocket  clips  were 
the  primary  training  aids.  While  this  program  represented  an  ideal  plan, 
it  had  to  be  modified  considerably  at  times  to  accommodate  varying  class 
sizes,  training  time  available,  and  operational  considerations.  Normally, 
the  composition  of  the  classes  consisted  of  three-fourths  enlisted  oper¬ 
ators  in  grades  E2  to  Bl* ,  the  balance  of  the  class  being  commissioned  and 


non-commissioned  officers.  The  latter  group  received  the  instruction  in 
preparation  for  future  training  at  the  unit  level,  and  to  apprise  them¬ 
selves  of  the  capabilities  of  the  system. 

(2)  Observations 


It  became  apparent  that  there  were  two  key  aspects  of  a 
training  program  for  the  XM191  MPFW:  (l)  The  amount  of  practical  exer¬ 
cise,  including  dry  firing,  and  (2)  the  number  of  practice  rounds  a  gunner 
should  fire  to  be  considered  qualified  with  the  weapon.  As  discussed  in 
Paragraph  9b(2),  considerable  drill  was  required  before  a  gunner  acquired 
the  proper  dexterity  in  the  loading,  firing,  and  unloading  sequences  of 
the  system.  Observations  indicated  that  from  one  to  two  hours  of  repeti¬ 
tive  practice  were  necessary  to  develop  the  requisite  skills.  Despite 
the  commonality  of  many  components  of  the  XM202  launcher  with  the  M72  LAW 
system,  the  two  were  sufficiently  dissimilar  in  operating  procedures  to 
require  distinct  training  programs.  The  XM191  MPFW  training  program  re¬ 
flected  the  increased  complexity  of  the  weapon.  The  formal  POI  employed 
by  the  NETT  required  each  gunner  to  fire  two  rounds  for  qualification. 
Gunners  that  subsequently  fired  the  weapon  in  combat  stated  that  they 
felt  qualified  after  firing  from  one  to  eight  rockets,  with  the  average 
being  three.  No  attempt  was  made  to  correlate  the  number  of  first-round 
hits  achieved  in  combat  with  the  number  of  rockets  fired  ir.  training 
because  of  the  many  variables  involved  in  the  combat  environment.  Obsrr- 
vatiors  of  firings  during  training  indicated  that  th*-  average  gunner  could 
sco re  neeeptable  hits  on  targets  at  ranges  from  100  to  200  meters  with  the 
seccnd  round  fired.  With  increased  availability  of  ammunition,  it  would 
probably  be  desirable  for  each  gunner  to  fire  an  entire  clip  (four  rounds) 
in  training;  the  first  few  rounds  overcomes  the  normal,  initial  apprehen¬ 
sion-,  subsequent  rounds  build  the  runner's  confidence  in  the  veapon  and 
in  his  ovr.  ability  to  fire  it  accurately. 

h .  Training  Ammunition 

Early  ir  the  training  activities,  it  was  apparent  that  a  require¬ 
ment  existed  for  inert  training  ammunition.  The  nature  of  the  launcher 
mechanism  and  functioning  cycles  required  a  rocket  clip  or  facsimile  that 
would  retain  the  firing  pin  mechanism  assembly  in  the  rearward  position 
and  permit  the  normal  firing  cycle  to  occur.  Likewise,  the  sequences  of 
preparation- for-f iring ,  unloading,  and  the  hangfir^-misf ire-mechari cal 
delay  procedures,  all  required  an  inert  clip  for  realistic  practice.  A 
spent  (fired)  rocket  clip  could  be  rap Joyed  for  this  purpose,  but  there 
was  a  considerable  risk  of  damage  to  the  launcher  tubes.  The  sharp  edg°s 
of  the  aluminum  rocket  tubes  were  likely  to  scratch  the  interior  of  the 
fiberglass  launcher  tubes,  particularly  following  repetitive  use.  This 
practice  could  render  the  launcher  unserviceable.  Inert  clips  provided 
to  units  by  the  NETT  sufficed  for  the  interim  evaluation  period;  however, 
a  basis  of  issue  remains  to  be  determined. 


Technical  Documentation 


The  technical  manual,  TM  3-1055-218-12,  both  in  draft  form  and 
as  a  formal  DA  publication,  were  Judged  to  be  adequate  during  the  period 
of  the  interim  evaluation.  All  respondents  have  indicated  satisfaction 
with  the  format  and  content  of  these  documents. 

11.  INTERIM  CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 

a.  Conclusions 

Tentative  conclusions  based  on  the  90-day  interim  evaluation  are: 

(1)  The  XM191  MPFW  possesses  adequate  range,  accuracy,  and  tar¬ 
get  effect  to  engage  and  neutralize  a  variety  of  targets. 

(2)  The  XM202  rocket  launcher  and  XM71*  rocket  are  reliable  under 
field  conditions. 

(3)  The  weapon  system  is  capable  of  performing  a  much  wider 
variety  of  tactical  missions  than  standard  portable  flame  weapons. 

(U)  The  utility  of  the  XM191  MPFW  is  limited  in  dense  Jungle 
terrain  by  minimum  range  restrictions. 

( 5 )  Commanders  generally  agree  on  the  need  for  a  weapon  of 
this  type. 

(6)  Dismounted  infantry  consider  the  weapon  too  bulky  and  heavy 
to  carry  regularly  on  extended  operations. 

(7)  Logistical  support  and  maintenance  of  the  XM191  MPFW  are 

simple. 

(8)  The  XM191  MPFW  is  considerably  more  complex  than  the  M72 
LAW  system,  and  consequently  requires  a  more  extensive  training  program. 

(9)  A  requirement  exists  for  inert  training  ammunition. 

b.  Recommendations 

Based  on  the  limited  conclusions,  it  is  recommended  that: 

(1)  The  evaluation  be  continued  as  scheduled. 

(2)  Procurement  of  the  XM191  MPFW  be  continued. 

(3) .  Product  improvement  efforts  toward  simplification  of  weapons 
system  operation  be  continued. 


(U)  Preliminary  procurement  plans  be  formulated  to  provide  inert 
training  ammunition  on  a  basis  to  be  determined. 


2  Inclosures 

1 .  Annex  A 

2.  Annex  B 


C. 

C.  B.  McCold 
Colonel,  IN 
Commanding 


17 


Ainrex  a 


XVI ?1  !7JLTTrH0T  PORTABLE  FLAME  W?ApOU  SYFmKM  (ITFW) 


1  .  omegiT^TOH 


a.  General 


The  major  components  of  the  XM191  MPFW  are  the  Launcher,  Rocket: 
''''■mm,  Multishot,  XM202,  referred  to  as  the  XV202  rocket  launcher,  and 
the  Rocket,  Incendiary:  66nm,  TPA ,  U-Round  Clip,  XM74,  referred  to  as 
the  X’,7I*  incendiary  rocket  clip. 

b.  XM202  Pocket  Launcher 


The  launcher  component  of  the  XM191  system  consists  of  4-66mm 
fiberglass  tubes  arranged  tvo-by-tvo  and  secured  by  bulkheads  at  both 
ends  (see  Figure  la).^-  The  firing  pin  mechanism  is  located  in  the  center 
of  the  tube  cluster.  The  trigger  -  handle  assembly  is  attached  to  the 
forward  end  of  the  launcher.  In  its  carrying  configuration,  front  and 
rear  covers  seal  the  launcher  against  dirt  and  moisture  (see  Figure  lb). 

The  front  cover  also  serves  to  unlatch  and  permit  extraction  of  the 
trigger  -  handle  assembly  from  the  body  of  the  launcher  where  it  retracts 
in  the  carrying  configuration.  The  rear  cover  protects  the  firing  pin 
mechanism  assembly.  A  reflecting-type  sight  and  carrying  sling  are 
mounted  on  the  left,  side  r/  the  launcher  (see  Figure  3). 

c  .  y *71  p neend  i  ary  pocket  Flip 

'"he  reckct  clip  consists  of  four  aluminum  tuber,  bourd  together  by 
a  star  shared  manifold  (see  Figure  2).  Each  tube  is  preloaded  with  c.  C('~r. 
rochet,  '"he  tubes  are  grouped  in  the  same  two-by-two  pattern  os  the  XM20? 
rocket  launcher  and  slip-fit  into  the  launcher  tubes.  Each,  rocket  consists 
of  a  warhead  which  cortair.s  1.3  pounds  of  thickened  tri  ethyl  aluminum  ("’PA), 
and  ar  M54  rocket  motor.  The  t hi ckened  triethylaluninum  ignites  spontane¬ 
ously  when  exposed  to  air.  The  rocket  fuze  is  a  base-detonating ,  non-delay- 
action  type.  Tt  arms  after  the  rocket  has  traveled  a  minimum  of  5.?  meters 
and  a  maximum  of  13  meters. 

d .  Operation 

The  rocket  launcher  is  fired  from  the  right  shoulder  usino  ary  of 
the  standard  firing  positions.  Tt  is  used  to  neutralize  both  point  and 
area  targets.  It  is  semi-automatic,  and  capable  of  firing  ■"rom  one  to 
four  incendiary  rockets  at  a  rate  of  more  than  one  round  per  second.  It. 
can  be  reloaded  with,  a  new  rochet  clip  in  approximately  30  seconds.  After 
arming,  deceleration  on  impact  activates  the  rocket  fuze,  initiating  tie 
detonator  .and  the  primacord  burster  in  turn.  On  open  terrain  the  incendi- 
ary  to a  is  disseminated  in  burning  droplets  over  a  20-meter  radius. 

1.  Figure  references  indicate  the  appropriate  figures  given  at  Sectic*'  G, 
>scr  1  j  tier  . 


•AP’JLA^FD  HAmA 


3^3*  r»f  1  n.uncbe** 

V/ei  pht  of  XM7*i  elir  viti.  rockets 
Weight  of  XVI 93  *!PFV? 

T.cnmth,  closed 

L,er~t>  ,  extended  vith  clip 

"uzzlr.  velocit 

°an~e,  maximum 

Pange,  effective  for  point  targets 
Operatin';  temperature  limits 


11.5  pounds 

15.1  pounds 

Pfi.6  rounds 

?7.0  inches 

3^.75  inches 

350  feet  per  second 

730  meters 

200  meters 

3?°  _  il*c°  F 


A  -?